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Zakat, the obligation to look after people in need by giving them a 
share of the wealth flowing through society, is recognized in the 
Islamic tradition as both a personal pious action and an 
institutional practice formalized by legal regimes. This dual 
character provides zakat with considerable malleability. Focusing 
on the trajectory of the “zakat committee” of Nablus since the 
1970s, this article analyzes the different social and legal 
mechanisms that hold zakat committees in Palestine accountable. 
First, zakat committee members are under the constant observation 
of the local community and exposed to their ethical judgement. The 
local reputation of the zakat committee in Nablus depends on their 
integrity in running the committee and on their display of Muslim 
virtues in social interactions with others. Secondly, regional 
governments oversee zakat committees and hold them accountable. 
Finally, committee members have come under the increasing 
scrutiny of security surveillance and global policies of “combatting 
the financing of terrorism,” leading to forced closures in 2007. Due 
to the contested nature of political power in Nablus (the city has 
been under military occupation since 1967), these different 
mechanisms of accountability are sometimes remarkably 
disconnected. Notwithstanding, the malleability of zakat as a 
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Muslim practice adapting to changing circumstances provides this 
form of care for people in need with tenacity. 
  




Ahmed Sharaf’s phone was ringing constantly. A few months ago, 
Sharaf had become the leading religious scholar (‘ālim, also referred to 
as sheikh) on the Nablus zakat committee. He sat down to have a 
conversation with me, an academic from Europe interested in how 
institutionalized zakat in the Palestinian territories was evolving. Having 
just arrived to his office, Sharaf had not taken off his winter coat. He 
excused himself and picked up the phone. The man on the other line 
wanted to know the sheikh’s opinion regarding a conflict over money. 
The sheikh listened patiently and promised to sit down with the man and 
the other party of the conflict on Friday to settle the matter. Sharaf tried 
to calm the man down and said that, based on what he had heard so far, 
the man seemed to be in the right from a “sharia point of view.” He 
reiterated, however, that he would need to speak to the other side of the 
conflict as well in order to arrive at a final opinion. The man on the other 
line would not stop talking and continued to explain all the things that 
happened. Every now and then, the sheikh gave me an apologetic look. 
On the phone, he remained nice and understanding. When the man 
finally hung up, Sharaf sighed and said:  
 
This work [as a popular and trusted sheikh] can be very 
tiresome. People are calling me all the time and they want 
immediate responses. They are simple, here. You cannot tell 
them to wait and explain to them that you are busy now.  […] 
Sometimes, all this gets too much though. The other day a man 
told me on the phone that I am not serving him, but that he is 
serving me. At this point, I hung up. 
 
Zakat committees in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian 
territories occupied by Israel in 1967, usually include small- and 
medium-sized entrepreneurs, personalities known for their Islamic 
literacy and local politicians. They collect zakat—the share of wealth 
that the Quran prescribes to give away to support people in need—and 
organize its distribution. Moreover, they use local and international 
donations of sadaqa (supererogatory gifts by the faithful) to run small 
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The Palestinian Authority governing the West Bank under the 
tutelage of Israeli occupation forced dozens of zakat committees to close 
in 2007 and 2008, accusing them of supporting the Islamic Resistance 
Movement, Hamas. The United States and the European Union 
considered Hamas to be a “terrorist organization” and refused to 
recognize the movement’s victory in Palestinian parliamentary elections 
in 2006. In 2007, Hamas achieved control over the Gaza Strip by force, 
while the Palestinian Liberation Movement, Fatah, continued to rule the 
West Bank with US and EU backing.  
After the forced closures, new centralized committees were 
composed of people loyal to the Fatah government, replacing a locally 
rooted system of more than ninety committees. The centralized 
committees struggled to operate. Lacking the trust of the local 
community, they soon had to give up. Instead of giving the money to the 
committee, people were paying zakat and sadaqa directly to needy 
families in their proximity (Schaeublin, 2019). In 2013, a new zakat 
committee was composed in Nablus with people known for their piety, 
integrity, and independence from the petty politics of different 
Palestinian parties. The aim was to regain local confidence, which had 
been lost after the top-down interventions in the zakat sector. Ahmed 
Sharaf, a popular and trusted personality in Nablus, joined the committee 
at this moment. Before that, he had been imam in the Great Mosque in 
Nablus. In their attempt to regain popular trust, zakat committee 
members needed to cultivate a good reputation and be responsive to 
people’s demands. As mentioned above, this was no easy task. 
In a context such as the Palestinian territories, zakat institutions 
are held accountable in several ways: first, zakat committees are under 
the scrutiny of local communities, who observe committee members and 
hold them accountable by constantly evaluating whether they remain 
worthy of a good reputation. Second, they report to historically changing 
government apparatuses including the Palestinian Authority, the Israeli 
government, and the state of Jordan. Finally, their work has evolved 
under the Israeli occupying power and global policies of “combating the 
financing of terrorism” (Biersteker & Eckert, 2008; de Goede, 2012). 
Data collected through security surveillance sustains international court 
cases against donors to zakat committees and banks that have carried out 
transfers of funds. 
Muslim piety plays a key role for committee members 
maintaining a good reputation. Piety, in this context, depends on people’s 
ability to embody (Mahmood, 2005) and display (Schaeublin, 2019) 
Islamic virtues. A woman told me that she had observed Sharaf when he 
used to go to a library in order to study for a degree from the Sharia 
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He was very conscientious and meticulous in his way of 
studying. In my eyes, he has the qualities (ṣifāt) of the Prophet, 
such as truthfulness (ṣidq), trust-worthiness (amāna), and 
fairness (nazāha). This is not self-evident for people working in 
mosques as employees of the Palestinian Authority’s Ministry 
of Awqaf where not everybody has good ethical conduct 
(akhlāq). His conduct, however, is exceptional. 
 
In the Palestinian case, the different forms of accountability outlined 
above are disconnected from one another. Local perspectives, for 
instance, have very little weight in court cases abroad against donors to 
zakat institutions. During the forced closures, many people saw 
governmental control of the committees as partly detrimental to local 
structures of self-help. Recent developments, however, illustrate that a 
basic compromise between local communities in the West Bank and the 
Palestinian Authority in Ramallah has been reestablished.  
In spite of political turmoil, zakat giving never ceases. Its 
quality as both a personal virtue (a pious act of giving) and an obligation 
legally formalized in changing historical contexts endows it with a 
considerable malleability (on the “plasticity” of the Islamic tradition in 
changing circumstances, see Clarke, 2018). When the intermediary 
institutions coordinating its collection and distribution crumble, Muslims 
can give their zakat directly to people in need and later return to giving 
it to an institution they trust. 
In what follows, I will first discuss zakat’s dual character as a 
virtue and as an institutional practice. Then, I will discuss the historical 
trajectory of institutionalized zakat in Nablus. In a next step, I will 
discuss how the local community is holding zakat committee members 
accountable by observing and morally evaluating their actions. I shall 
then contrast this material with the mechanisms employed by 
government apparatuses and intelligence services for the purpose of 
holding zakat committees legally accountable for their actions. The 
conclusion reflects on the implications of the disconnection between 
these different mechanisms of accountability. 
The fieldwork for this article took place from 2013 to 2014 in 
the central areas of the Palestinian city of Nablus (Figure 1), thirty miles 
north of Jerusalem, whose roughly 120,000 inhabitants are surrounded 
by Israeli military bases and settlements. Nablus has a reputation as a 
conservative Muslim city (Doumani, 1995) with minorities of Christians 
and Samaritans. The city lies in the West Bank. Since 1994, the 
administrative body of the Palestinian Authority has been governing its 
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siege imposed during the Second Palestinian Intifada (2000 to 2006) 
crushed the city’s industry and left hundreds of households dependent on 
financial support from relatives, neighbors, or different international 
providers of aid. 
 
 
Figure 1: Entry gate to the Great Mosque in the old city of Nablus. © Jonas Opperskalski, 
2014.   
 
The focus of my fieldwork was on face-to-face interactions between 
givers and receivers of zakat and the presence of Islamic discourse in 
practices of exchange more generally. In parallel, I participated in the 
different activities of the Nablus zakat committee, including the 
distribution of food from the soup kitchen, the moving of office material 
to a new building, and the collection of zakat from local shops during 
Ramadan. My previous publications on Palestinian zakat institutions 
available in Arabic opened many doors, as it gave my interlocutors an 
insight into my way of thinking about the issue. I regularly spent time 
with different board members of the committee and accompanied some 
of them on visits to poor households.  
 
Zakat between Virtue and Institutional Practice 
 
In the Islamic tradition (Asad, 1986), giving zakat is a condition for 
living a good Muslim life. Islamic scholars interpreting the Islamic texts 





Volume IV • Number II • 2020 
33JOURNAL OF MUSLIM PHILANTHROPY & CIVIL SOCIETY 
The Quran mentions zakat on 32 occasions, often closely connecting it 
to prayer with connotations of growth and purity. As ritual washing 
cleanses the body to prepare it for praying, giving away a share of one’s 
wealth as zakat purifies a person’s possessions (Hallaq, 2009, p. 231). 
Payment is due on assets held for the period of one Islamic calendar year. 
Muslims are obliged to annually pay 2.5% of their financial wealth 
beyond the threshold set at the value equivalent to 85 grams of gold 
(Singer, 2008, pp. 40–41). Supererogatory gifts, beyond what one owes 
as zakat, are classified as sadaqa for moveable property or as waqf for 
unmovable property, such as real estate. Sadaqa has connotations of 
justice (on the implications of this, see Mittermaier, 2014).  
A key passage (Quran 9, 60; transl. Asad, 1980) that continues 
to be invoked by people practicing zakat lists eight categories of eligible 
beneficiaries: 
 
the poor and the needy [or helpless], and those who are in 
charge thereof [the people entrusted with the collection and 
distribution of such funds], and those whose hearts are to be 
won over, and for the freeing of human beings from bondage, 
and [for] those who are overburdened with debts, and [for 
every struggle] in God’s cause [literally: in the way of God], 
and [for] the wayfarer: [this is] an ordinance from God.1F1 
 
In addition to this, the Quran (76, 8) mentions giving to orphans—i.e., to 
children who have lost their father, rendering their attachment to a group 
of agnatic kin potentially fragile—as a sign of the virtuous among 
Muslims. 
Zakat can give rise to simple acts of giving in face-to-face 
encounters or it can be channeled through distributing intermediary 
committees as stipulated by the category of “those who are in charge” of 
zakat in the passage above. The idea of creating committees that pool 
zakat and arrange for its distribution has been retained in the tradition 
(on which, see, e.g., the work of Ghazali, 1966, pp. 23–25, who lived in 
the 11th century).  
                                                          
1  While listing the legitimate recipients of sadaqa, this verse is commonly invoked in 
the Islamic tradition to refer to the people one should give one’s zakat to (on which, 
see, e.g., Bashear, 1993). The listed categories are the subject of discussions among 
Muslim scholars (see, e.g., Benthall & Bellion-Jourdan, 2009, p. 10). Controversial 
issues of interpretation are, for instance, whether zakat can be given to non-Muslims, 
given the category of “the wayfarer,” and whether zakat can be used for military 
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Interpreters of the historical role of zakat (Hurgronje, 1957; 
Hallaq, 2009, p. 231; Fauzia, 2013, p. 47) point to its dual character. On 
the one hand, zakat is defined as a virtue and key element in the worship 
of God. On the other hand, zakat can become an integrated part of the 
taxation systems of centralized political bodies run by Sunni Muslims in 
different geographic and historical contexts (Bashear, 1993, pp. 99–108; 
Scott, 1987; Sijpesteijn, 2013, pp. 178–198; Singer, 2008, pp. 47–48).2F2 
Arguably, the direct and informal character of zakat giving has 
historically been more important (Falcioni, 2012, p. 461).  
In the 20th century, zakat sometimes became part of the tax 
system of modern states. This is the case, for instance, in Saudi Arabia 
(Derbal, unpublished manuscript), Sudan, Pakistan, or, since 2011, in the 
Gaza Strip under the rule of the Islamic movement Hamas (Schaeublin, 
2014, pp. 25). In Iran after the Shi‘i Islamic revolution in 1979, however, 
neither zakat nor the Shi‘i concept of Islamic giving (khums) were 
included in the tax system.3 F3 In other countries, Islamic opposition 
movements built nongovernmental institutional structures for collecting 
and distributing zakat. With the retreat of states from welfare provisions 
since the 1970s, such nongovernmental zakat institutions flourished, as 
they were able to fill the void left behind (Atia, 2013; Tugal, 2013). In 
the course of the war in contemporary Yemen, Houthi militants started 
to impose obligatory khums to extract taxes from territories under their 
control (Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, 2020).  
Since the 1970s, zakat institutions in many places have evolved 
in a climate of political repression. The legal frameworks and policies 
advanced by different governments in states where people practice zakat 
were marked by a certain suspicion toward Islamic institutions (Pierret 
& Selvik, 2009; De Cordier, 2010; Lacey & Benthall, 2014; Erie, 2016). 
This is less the case in Jordan. Here, the Muslim Brotherhood constitutes 
a kind of loyal opposition to the monarchy and zakat institutions have 
become an integrated part of the state’s welfare system (Clark, 2004). In 
places where state structures remain weak, outsiders tend to perceive 
zakat institutions as possibly subversive social wings of Islamic political 
movements such as Hizbullah in Lebanon (Deeb, 2006; Cammett, 2014). 
                                                          
2  See also Calder (2006/1981, p. 223). Kuran (2003) and Wolf (1951) provide somewhat 
cynical readings of this duality, arguing that the nascent Islamic state used zakat as an 
ideological justification to extract funds from its subjects. On the whole, such readings 
of the distant past remain speculative. Bashear (1993, p. 86) observed that the question 
on the origins and the development of zakat in early Islam has not been satisfactorily 
answered. This is, I think, still the case.  
3  Personal communication with anthropologist Shirin Naef. On khums and its relation 
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This situation creates a dilemma for local practitioners of zakat. 
If they move too closely to state structures that people perceive as corrupt 
and repressive, they no longer receive zakat from the population. If they 
go too far in evading state control, governments might perceive them as 
subversive to their rule (at best) or as a channel of potentially “terrorist” 
militancy (at worst). Against this background, successful zakat 
institutions in Arab-Muslim majority countries need to reconcile 
different demands. They are held accountable by the local communities 
they serve, (authoritarian) governments, and emerging mechanisms of 
global security surveillance in the context of the War against Terror.  
In the Palestinian case, to which I will now turn, the 
disconnection between such different mechanisms for holding zakat 
committees accountable is particularly pronounced. Since the 1970s, 
zakat institutions in Palestine evolved in a historical context of changing 
government apparatuses, and Israeli (non-Muslim) military rule. 
Moreover, Palestine is arguably one of the focal points of global security 
surveillance. The deep running tension between zakat institutions’ 
accountability to the local community and global technologies of 
surveillance is not unique to Palestine, but it affects the work of Islamic 
social institutions and other organizations in the region more generally.  
 
The Historical Trajectory of Institutionalized Zakat in 
Nablus 
 
In the Ottoman Empire, charitable giving tended to fall under the 
category of endowments (waqf) rather than zakat (Singer, 2018, p. 10). 
Consequently, zakat practices in Palestine before the end of Ottoman rule 
in 1917 are a relatively obscure topic. Fahmi Ansari, a librarian in East 
Jerusalem, told me that the Islamic authorities in Ottoman Istanbul had 
no connection to zakat collection in Palestine. According to him, the 
general population (‘awām) in Ottoman Palestine collected and 
distributed zakat as a form of worship rooted in society that took place 
outside of the administrative influence of the government. In 1907, 
however, Ottoman rulers issued a law allowing them to register Islamic 
charitable societies and to, thereby, exercise governmental control over 
zakat collections and local power structures.4F4 
In Nablus, official structures for zakat practices were in place 
at least since 1956, when the Jordanian government registered the 
                                                          
4  For a rough overview of laws regulating Islamic charitable giving in Palestine since 
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Tadamun Islamic Charitable Society, allowing a group of men from 
important families to run a center for Quran memorization and sharia 
teaching, providing informal justice consultations, and offering aid to 
people in need.5F5 In 1967, Israel occupied the West Bank, but the 
Jordanian government continued governing the civil affairs of the 
Palestinian population living under Israeli military rule. 
In 1977, the Jordanian government registered the first 
Palestinian zakat committee in Nablus. It granted legal status to a 
hitherto informal group of men who had been collecting and distributing 
zakat from within the Hanbali mosque.6F6 Legal registration allowed for 
access to international funding and the gradual diversification of 
activities. With the support of Muslim communities in Europe and North 
America as well as Islamic charitable societies in different Muslim 
majority countries, the committee created schools, medical clinics, 
orphan sponsorship programs, Quran memorization centers, and a milk 
factory, giving jobs to poor people from the refugee camps on the 
outskirts of Nablus. Over the years, the Nablus zakat committee turned 
into an exemplary model, and its projects were partly replicated (with 
room for variation) in other cities of the West Bank (Schaeublin, 2009), 
Jerusalem (Iwais & Schaeublin, 2011), the Gaza Strip (Schaeublin, 
2012), and Jordan (Clark, 2004, pp. 109–110, 153). 
Adly Yaish was central to the trajectory of the Nablus zakat 
committee until 2007, when the Palestinian Authority forcibly brought it 
under its control. He told me that his father used to take him, when he 
was still a boy, to the Old City where most of the poor people in Nablus 
lived. They went to different shopkeepers and asked them which families 
in the neighborhood were short of money. Shopkeepers knew these 
things because they observed the consumption patterns of people in the 
neighborhood. Based on the hints given at the shops, Yaish and his father 
visited poor families in their homes. According to Yaish, mosques also 
pooled knowledge about the people in the vicinity. Men running 
mosques sent people out to look for deprived households and made sure 
to cover their needs. 
Once established, the zakat committee scaled up this more 
“systematic” (niẓāmī) approach to zakat. They conducted surveys on 
poor households and identified 200 families. To their surprise, they 
                                                          
5  Interview (in 2014) with Amin Maqbul, who was serving as president of the charitable 
society at the time. 
6  See also Schaeublin (2009, p. 16). The Jordanians governed Islamic affairs, including 
zakat, sadaqa, and waqf lands (awqāf) from their representation in Jerusalem. On the 
political role of Jordanians in governing Islamic institutions and discourse in this 
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discovered that a number of them were receiving zakat from different 
donors, while others only from a few. This imbalance pushed them to 
improve the coordination of zakat. In order to prevent certain poor 
families from deceiving their donors, they started keeping detailed 
records on the recipients. Resorting to surveys and statistics, they 
generated what Yaish called “clean knowledge.” According to him, this 
helped them gain the trust of people in Nablus, who started confiding 
their zakat to the committee. 
Abd al-Rahim al-Hanbali has also been involved in the zakat 
committee for several decades—succeeding his father as president 
(Benthall, 2008, p. 15). During an interview in 2013, he told me that a 
“systematic” approach serves to preserve the dignity of poor families by 
transmitting “zakat to the poor via bank accounts [avoiding the recipients 
being seen by their neighbors when receiving money].” Moreover, he 
mentioned the committee’s efforts in establishing a system of keeping 
and updating files on poor families based on social visits and inquiries in 
the neighborhood carried out by both male and female staff to gain a 
complete picture. 
During the course of this work, Jordanian administrators 
governing civil affairs under Israeli military rule articulated a legal 
model for zakat committees, the Jordanian Zakat Fund Law Number 8 
of the Year 1988. A central zakat fund within Jordan’s government was 
the only body entitled to establish and supervise zakat committees in 
different parts of Jordan and the West Bank. The zakat committees in 
different cities and towns were locally autonomous in their operations 
and effectively had a monopoly over the collection and distribution of 
zakat funds. Receiving zakat from donors inside and outside the country, 
the committees were obliged to pay 10 to 20% of their annual income to 
the central Zakat Fund. 
The Jordanian law partly took up the categories of eligible 
beneficiaries as laid out in the Quran. Article 8a lists the following kinds 
of people and activities that are allowed to be supported by the central 
zakat fund: 
 
1. The poor (fuqarā’) and the needy (masākīn); 
2. Poor students; 
3. Orphans, the geriatric, the poor, the handicapped, and the 
institutions that take care of them; 
4. The poor sick and the institutions that take care of them; 
5. Foreigners in need; 
6. Publishing [leaflets] that incite [people to adhere] to Islamic 
practice (da‘wa) and [supporting] the poor [persons] working 
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7. Those afflicted with misfortune without [their] wrongdoing 
(ma‘aṣiyya) because of a flood, a bankruptcy, a fire, an 
earthquake, or another [misfortune]; 
8. The activists [or fighters] on God’s path (al-mujāhidīn fī 
sabīl allah); 
9. Necessary activities for managing the [zakat] fund, provided 
that expenditures do not annually exceed ten per cent of the 
income (wāridāt) of the fund. 
 
Point eight in the list—“the activists [or fighters] in the way of God”—
echoes the expression “in the way of God” listed in the Quran. The use 
of the term mujāhidīn (fighters or activists) “in the way of God” raises 
the question whether zakat and sadaqa can be used for military projects. 
In fact, the category “in the way of God” is contested among Muslim 
scholars (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, 2009, pp. 69–84; Kuran, 2003).7F7 
In 1968, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia issued a recommendation 
declaring the use of zakat for supporting Palestinian resistance legitimate 
(Hegghammer, 2010, p. 20). With regard to the Palestinian zakat 
committees, however, I have so far not come across evidence suggesting 
they were used to channel funding directly supporting armed struggle. 
Families of Palestinian martyrs and prisoners seem to have occasionally 
received support from zakat committees, but not in any disproportionate 
or rewarding way (for a detailed discussion, see Benthall, 2017). 
The Jordanian zakat law brings all forms of zakat transfers 
passing through institutional bodies under the control of the state by 
means of bureaucratic reporting tools. The 1990 Management and 
Finance Regulations (Article 14b) state that all donations be registered 
with cash receipts. The Zakat Committee Regulations of 1996 (Article 
3b) defines the criteria for the composition of zakat committees, avoiding 
overrepresentation of a specific family and requiring ethical qualities 
from committee members. The 1996 Regulations (Article 3d) stipulate 
that no relatives up to the fourth degree are to be represented in the same 
zakat committee and list (Article 4) the following conditions for 
becoming a member of a zakat committee:  
 
1) To be of Jordanian [respectively, Palestinian] nationality; 
                                                          
7  Goldziher (1890, pp. 390–391) argues that while this phrase was first interpreted in 
the context of warfare (jihād), it has gradually been extended to include every action 
that pleases God, such as giving sadaqa through the establishment of public fountains 
(themselves called sabīl, the word used for “way”). For a discussion of the very 
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2) To be of good conduct (sīra), demeanor (sulūk), and 
reputation and not to be convicted of a felony or any 
misdemeanor in violation of honor (sharaf) or general morals 
(akhlāq ‘āmma); 
3) To be descendants [from families from] the governorate, 
district, or region [where] the committee works; 
4) To be literate. 
 
The law acknowledges the observation and ethical evaluation of the 
zakat committee members within their community, using words such as 
conduct, demeanor, reputation, honor, and morals. Below, I look at how 
accountability through social observation in Nablus works concretely.  
Within this legal framework, the Nablus zakat committee 
developed institutional relations with donor organizations in the United 
Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Jordan, France, and Canada (Nablus Zakat Committee, 
n.d., p. 2). The Palestinian zakat committees in the 1990s were 
financially independent from the Palestinian Authority, as well as from 
European and American governmental and nongovernmental 
organizations. Not being “docile” to such donor apparatuses allowed 
them to determine their own priorities and to develop projects in 
accordance with local communities (Hilal & Maliki, 1997, p. 62). In the 
case of the Nablus zakat committee before the closures in 2007 and 2008, 
a considerable degree (up to 90%) of local funding further enhanced its 
autonomy.8F8  
An important source of income for the Nablus zakat committee 
is its waqf properties. Waqf is technically a subcategory of sadaqa 
because it generates a regular stream of wealth or services that benefits 
the community (Hallaq, 2009, pp. 142–146). In Islamic history, waqf 
endowments led to the building of “mosques, Sufi khanqahs, hospitals, 
public fountains, soup kitchens, traveler’s lodges, and a variety of public 
works, notably bridges…. A typical waqf consisted of a mosque and 
rental property (e.g., shops), the rent from which supported the operation 
and maintenance of the mosque” (Hallaq, 2009, p. 142). 
According to Adly Yaish, since its inception, the Nablus zakat 
committee had developed a plot of waqf land of 50,000 square meters on 
the northern hill—based on donations and investments by the committee. 
On this land, the committee built a hospital and rented the building out 
to the University of Nablus. The income from the rent goes to the zakat 
committee, constituting a constant flow of sadaqa. On the rest of the waqf 
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plot, the committee built a middle school and an elementary school for 
orphans.  
The committee developed its activities and projects, including 
social work monitoring poor families, regular financial support, 
emergency aid to poor families, in-kind aid, animals for slaughter on the 
occasion of religious feasts, orphan sponsorship programs, scholarships, 
financial aid for medical treatments, Quran memorization centers, and a 
medical complex attached to a mosque (Nablus Zakat Committee, n.d., 
pp. 8–12). The committee also established a dairy, which was the first 
Palestinian factory in the West Bank producing pasteurized milk—and 
hence a step toward becoming more independent from Israeli 
agriculture.9F9 
After the peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization in 1993, partial Palestinian self-governance 
started in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the aim of gradually 
developing into an independent state. Yasir Arafat, presiding over the 
newly established Palestinian Authority, made the Jordanian zakat 
committee model part of its governance tools.10F10 The Jordanian zakat 
laws remained applicable in the West Bank, as Arafat relegated the 
drafting of Palestinian zakat law to the final establishment of Palestinian 
statehood.11F11 Arafat defined the Palestinian Authority’s Ministry of 
Awqaf and Religious Affairs along the lines of its Jordanian equivalent 
and moved the waqf lands, Islamic affairs, and zakat committees in the 
West Bank and in the Gaza Strip under its responsibility. The zakat 
committees formally became part of the Palestinian Authority—even if 
they retained their local autonomy. Palestinian intelligence services, 
however, kept zakat committees and their members under tight scrutiny 
after 1996, as they were aware that the loyalty of locally rooted zakat 
committees could swing toward the political forces opposing the 
Palestinian Authority (Schaeublin, 2009, p. 59). 
Arafat’s policy toward zakat committees in this period reflected 
the need to integrate local structures of governance into the preparation 
for Palestinian statehood. His strategy toward local zakat committees 
was similar to his policy of partly coopting informal justice (iṣlāḥ) 
committees. In 1994, Arafat issued a decree establishing a department of 
tribal affairs within the president’s office that oversaw informal justice 
                                                          
9  Prior to the political turmoil in the zakat sector in 2008, this project had an exemplary 
reputation (Schaeublin, 2009, p. 26). 
10  Notice that the zakat committees in Jerusalem stayed under Jordanian jurisdiction 
(Iwais & Schaeublin, 2011). 
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committees. Thereby, Arafat sought to exercise political control over 
justice procedures operating outside a state framework by granting 
informal justice committees an official status and letting them carry on 
with their work (Khalidi et al., 2006, pp. 59, 90–91).12F12 
Since the early 2000s, zakat committees raised skepticism due 
to alleged links to Hamas. In 2005 and 2006, a Hamas-led Change and 
Reform bloc won municipal and parliamentary elections, presenting 
itself as a valid alternative to the notoriously corrupt Movement for the 
Liberation of Palestine, Fatah, which had dominated the Palestinian 
Authority since 1994. In its electoral campaign, Hamas tried to 
monopolize Islamic symbols and images, while promising constructive 
policies and political measures against corruption (Hroub, 2006). Zakat 
committees had a reputation for being both incorruptible and committed 
to Islamic ethics, while their board members tended to be locally rooted 
and representative of different “political colors.”13 F13 In 2005, Adly Yaish 
ran on the Change of Reform list as an independent candidate and was 
elected Mayor of Nablus. After his election, he resigned from the Nablus 
zakat committee.   
After the Islamist electoral victory in 2006 parliamentary 
elections, a number of secularists voiced the opinion that the work of the 
zakat committees had influenced the election results. At the same time, 
the United States and other countries increasingly put the newly elected 
Hamas government under pressure.14 F14 Internal Palestinian tensions 
degenerated into armed clashes between Hamas and Fatah. In 2007, 
Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip by force. In the West Bank, a 
Fatah-dominated emergency cabinet ruled with the support of Israel and 
the United States. 
This political division led to drastic political interference in the 
zakat committees. In the West Bank, more than 90 committees were shut 
down and replaced by 11 new committees under the control of the 
Palestinian Authority. Justifying these heavy-handed interferences in the 
zakat sector, the Palestinian Authority argued that zakat committees 
                                                          
12  In general, iṣlāḥ committees are structures that practice ṣulḥ, the settlement of conflicts 
based on customary law with varying importance given to Islamic law. There are a 
variety of different iṣlāḥ committees in Palestine belonging to different political 
movements or big families. A number of zakat committees in the Gaza Strip 
simultaneously serve as iṣlāḥ committees. Other iṣlāḥ committees operate under the 
umbrella of the League of Scholars of Palestine. 
13  Surveys on popular confidence in Palestinian institutions, carried out by the University 
of Birzeit, rank the zakat committees comparatively high (for an overview of these 
surveys, see Schaeublin, 2009, pp. 27–28). 
14  For an insider’s account of these international pressures, see the leaked end of mission 
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were fronts of Hamas, in spite of diverging opinions emphasizing the 
political pluralism of these institutions (Schaeublin, 2009, p. 49). This 
led to a new authoritarianism in the field of zakat, which also had 
repercussions in the Gaza Strip where Hamas increased government 
control over zakat institutions (Schaeublin, 2012). In hindsight, the 
closures of zakat committees in the West Bank appear to have taken 
place against the backdrop of pressures from the Israeli and the US 
governments (Milton-Edwards, 2017; see also Wikileaks, 2008). 
The question as to whether and how Hamas did control the 
zakat committees in the West Bank before 2007 has become increasingly 
important because of its legal implications for international charities and 
banks. To date, no court has convicted pre-2007 committees of misusing 
or diverting funds, while studies suggest that the committees included 
different political movements (even leftist groups).15 F15 Meanwhile, the 
United States government was creating a legal landscape allowing it to 
criminalize any direct or indirect “material support” to a designated 
terrorist organization (see James, 2019, for a general discussion).  
This had severe consequences for the zakat committees and the 
international institutions working with them. In US courts, it became 
possible to argue that the zakat committees were serving the interests of 
Hamas by enhancing the movement’s political agenda through “winning 
[the] hearts and minds” of the Palestinian population. Consequently, any 
institution that had provided financial support or financial services (such 
as wiring bank transfers) to Palestinian zakat committees could be held 
liable of “supporting terrorism”—leading to a series of legal 
proceedings, mainly in the United States and Europe (on which, see 
Benthall, 2011a, 2011b, 2016, 2017). 
The forced closures of zakat committees in the West Bank in 
2007 had disastrous outcomes for their charitable work. In Nablus, as in 
other West Bank governorates, the newly formed central zakat 
committees mainly consisted of people known for their loyalty to the 
Palestinian Authority in Ramallah. The Israeli government, however, 
continued to view these committees as connected to terrorist networks, 
and thereby deterred foreign donors from working with them. 
The chilling effect of such allegations on donations has been 
far-reaching (James, 2019a). At the same time, former donors—both 
local and international—had no trust in the new committees and stopped 
cooperating with them, notably because they felt that they were now too 
                                                          
15  This question has also led to a difference of view among researchers, which I will not 
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close to the notorious corruption and cronyism of the Palestinian 
Authority. The new zakat committees lacked funding, projects such as 
medical clinics and the dairy in Nablus became dysfunctional. Popular 
confidence waned.16F16 In 2011, turnover of zakat committees in the West 
Bank was down to an estimated 20% compared to pre-2007 (Schaeublin, 
2012, p. 79). The gap in aid provision was partly filled by an increase in 
the European Commission’s social welfare funding channeled through 
the Palestinian Authority’s Ministry of Social Affairs (Schaeublin, 2012, 
p. 80). The European Commission was running all the names of 
beneficiaries through a digital list of terror suspects maintained by World 
Check, a private security company originating in South Africa that was 
bought up by Thomson Reuters (Schaeublin, 2012, pp. 64–65; see also 
James, 2019a, pp. 156–157). In 2018, Blackstone bought a majority stake 
of Thomson Reuters’ Financial Risk Unit of which World Check was a 
part. As a result of the deal, the unit was renamed Refinitiv (Reuters, 
2018). 
Consequently, zakat distributions started flowing in discreet 
channels beyond the purview of governments (Schaeublin, 2019). My 
interlocutors emphasized the malleability of zakat in adapting to adverse 
circumstances: when institutional channels closed, zakat would simply 
find other ways in which to flow. As an Islamic obligation, there would 
always be people willing to give. In 2011, the Palestinian Authority 
realized that centralization in the field of zakat was not working because 
the damage to the local legitimacy of the zakat committees was too 
drastic. Accordingly, the Palestinian Ministry of Awqaf issued decrees 
allowing for the reopening of local subcommittees under the supervision 
of the central committees. 
Since 2013, the Nablus zakat committee has been in a process 
of recovery—albeit underlying tensions between Hamas and Fatah have 
continued. After having offered their resignation (Maan News, 2010), the 
members of the post-closure committee made room for new faces in 
2013 (Shasha News, 2013). The newcomers sought to improve the 
committee’s reputation in Nablus and to restore the trust of donors 
abroad. They opened a soup kitchen and provided cash assistance to poor 
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Accountability to the Local Community 
 
During my fieldwork in 2013 and 2014, the new committee members 
sought to prove their ability to effectively and responsibly deal with 
zakat funds. Aware of the fact that their success would depend on the 
community’s level of trust in them, they sought to maintain a good 
reputation. In this endeavor, they embodied Muslim piety, a state 
resulting from the combination of different Islamic virtues (Mahmood, 
2005). Virtues such as patience, modesty, reliance on God, honesty, and 
fairness—all derived from Islamic scriptures—played a key role in the 
committee members’ interactions with others.  
The community’s observation and ethical judgment of zakat 
committee members has a regulatory function and creates local 
accountability. The zakat committee member’s display of virtuousness 
was not merely about cultivating a pious self (Mahmood, 2005), but 
more importantly about presenting oneself to others. Drawing on 
Goffman (1959), Keane (2015, p. 147) has written of the “ethical work” 
of presenting oneself in such contexts. The “talk of the town” 
interpreting and judging people is crucial for a mechanism of 
accountability that works through people’s reputation in a close-knit 
community. I shall now show how the embodiment of Muslim piety in 
social interactions makes zakat committee members accountable to the 
community. 
My interlocutors praised some of the members that were on the 
committee before the forced takeover in 2008 as exemplars of Muslim 
piety and professionalism. Former president Abd al-Rahim al-Hanbali, 
for instance, was widely admired. A moderator from Radio Quran 
Nablus, whom I interviewed in 2014, described the changes that 
happened after Hanbali’s forced removal like this: 
 
After dissolving the old zakat committee, there were problems. 
From 2008 to 2012, the Nablus zakat committee was tattered 
(muhtari’a) and flimsy (mhalhala). People had no trust in the 
new members. Since 2013, a new committee is trying to regain 
trust, but confidence is still weak and nowhere near the level of 
the pre-2007 zakat committee. The judgement of the new 
committee depends on people’s opinions. People observe the 
new committee members closely. Before 2007, Abd al-Rahim al-
Hanbali was highly trusted. He is from a wealthy family and 
paid zakat to the committee from his own money. He is 
affectionate (muḥibb) towards others, committed to religion, 
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committee for tangible projects.…. Zakat work needs experts in 
the fields of the economy, management, and religion.  
 
At the time of my fieldwork, people in Nablus treated Hanbali with 
reverence, e.g., by coming out of their shops to kiss his cheeks and greet 
him warmly when he passed by. They considered him a sheikh, a pious 
man to whom one could turn for ethical guidance. He advised people on 
how to cope with marital and other kinds of relational problems. In his 
conversations with others in the streets of Nablus, he ceaselessly cited 
the Quran and sayings of Prophet Mohammed. Adly Yaish had an 
equally good reputation of being kind in his interactions and helping 
people to finance their pilgrimage to Mecca. People referred to him as 
an exemplar of honesty and transparency. Even his political enemies 
sometimes told me that Hajj Adly is “gold”—highlighting his integrity 
in dealing with others. 
Ahmed Sharaf, the sheikh introduced in the opening paragraphs 
of this article, not only sought to prove his virtuousness in interactions 
with others. Together with Ahmed al-Hindi, another member of the 
newly composed zakat committee, he was often fasting on regular 
weekdays. I sometimes saw them in the afternoon with tired looks on 
their faces. In meetings with others, they calmly refused to drink, 
explaining that they were fasting. Their gestures and their facial 
expressions manifested their pious self-restraint and modesty to the 
public gaze. Abu Faruk, a local entrepreneur joining the zakat committee 
as a member shortly before the end of my fieldwork, continuously lent 
his ear to people when going around the city (Figure 2). Moving in public 
space, he displayed his reliance on God in all of his undertakings by 
saying “in the name of God” or “oh Lord” before entering a door or 
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Figure 2. Abu Faruk, with a bag of food for a poor family, listening to a man in the old 
city. © Jonas Opperskalski. 
 
A leaflet of the Ramallah zakat committee (1997)—Ramallah is a 
Palestinian city between Nablus and Jerusalem—displayed the piety of 
its members by making general statements about the extreme sensitivity 
of handling money given as zakat: 
 
zakat funds are the right of their beneficiaries who are 
powerless and … [they] are unlike other funds. Whoever takes 
anything away from them in an illegal manner, acts as if he took 
from the [hell] fire, and whoever takes from [these funds] in this 
life, this will be a woe [for him] in the Hereafter. 
 
This statement invokes a cosmic system of divine bookkeeping (on 
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good and bad deeds and puts one’s financial dealings and transactions 
with others under scrutiny. This wider framework can lead to anxieties 
among zakat committee members. One person from a zakat committee 
in another Palestinian town told me the following: 
 
I am afraid of agreeing to the expenditure of zakat funds without 
really being able to know whether it is the right thing (al-ṣaḥḥ) 
to do. Some expenditures of the committee might go beyond the 
scope defined by [the category of] zakat. In the meetings of the 
committee, I mainly need to go through expenditures and agree 
to them. For example, we recently agreed on spending a large 
amount on the repair of … a building…. How can I know 
whether the amounts to which I give my agreement are not in 
breach of the eight categories of beneficiaries laid out in the 
Quran? 
 
Such insecurities and fears are further expressions of piety and crucial to 
the cultivation of a reputation of integrity.  
The local evaluation of zakat committee members based on this 
ethical Islamic framework enabled communities to hold institutionalized 
zakat practice in Palestine locally accountable over the years. For this 
reason, the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank returned to a style of 
governing zakat institutions that delegated the selection of committee 
members to the local level (Schaeublin, 2012, p. 83). By 2019, the 
number of local zakat committees in the West Bank had again increased 
to 41, according to an employee of the Palestinian Authority’s Ministry 
of Awqaf who told me that lack of trust was still an issue in some areas. 
Her advice to committee members in such situations was to be modest, 
honest, close to the people, respectable, distant from any tensions arising 
from family honor, direct in asking wealthy people for money, and free 
of tattoos.  
Men compose most zakat committees in Palestine. However, 
there are exceptions of women on many committees, including the one 
in Nablus. In general, however, women are more active as employees 
and social workers of zakat committees. Women in zakat practice play a 
key role in hiding direct transactions from the gaze of others in order to 
protect the dignity of the recipient (Schaeublin, 2019).  
Having shown how the Islamic tradition provides an ethical 
framework for holding zakat committee members accountable, I shall 
now contrast such local mechanisms of accountability anchored in 
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Accountability through Governance and Security 
Surveillance 
 
Administrative mechanisms of governance—as articulated in the 
Jordanian zakat law discussed above—focus on flows of money and 
beneficiaries. The piety of zakat committee members becomes also 
visible in their ability to keep clean records of their expenditures. 
Keeping files and producing financial reports for governmental oversight 
bodies has been part of the general push towards making zakat practice 
“systematic.” When the Palestinian Authority forced the Nablus zakat 
committee to close in 2008, all the documents, bank accounts, and 
properties that the committee handed over were reportedly flawless 
(Palestinian Authority Ministry of Awqaf 2008).   
New techniques of administration introduced in the 1970s made 
it possible to keep track of individuals and nuclear families with a view 
to their material situation and their ethical ways of living. In the self-
description of the Nablus zakat committee (1998), this overarching care 
for people becomes explicit: 
 
The committee aims at linking (rabṭ) people to God, Exalted and 
Sublime, spreading religious consciousness (al-wa‘ī al-dīnī), 
and inculcating the true (ṣaḥīḥa) Islamic conviction (‘aqīda) in 
the selves (nufūs) of the sons of the Islamic community 
(ummah). This is achieved through the spreading of Quran 
memorization centers in the region and their supervision 
[through the committee]. Moreover, [the committee] follows up 
on poor families and orphans religiously, educationally, 
economically, medically, and socially. 
 
At the time of my fieldwork in 2013 and 2014, the social workers of the 
Nablus zakat committee seemed little concerned with the “convictions” 
of poor people and stated that Christians are also eligible to receive aid 
from the committee. The social workers saw their job primarily in asking 
other people in the neighborhood about the degree of financial need that 
they could infer from a poor family’s behavior. They drew on people’s 
observations of others within neighborhoods to assess need (in a way that 
echoes the observation of zakat committee members above). Three 
female and two male social workers were regularly visiting poor families 
and keeping files on all recipients of zakat or sadaqa disbursed through 
the committee. A woman who had been in this job for twenty-six years 
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We go to the heart of the household (qalb al-dār) and then write 
down all the information we need on the family in order to fill 
out the file. Then, we ask the family whom in the neighborhood 
they would like us to question about them. We [merely make 
sure to assess the need of the family and] do not ask about debts 
and do not get involved in tensions between the poor family and 
others. Oftentimes, we go to talk to the head of the 
neighborhood (mukhtār al-ḥāra) who then leads us to hidden 
[i.e. poor] families [concealing their financial needs to 
others].17F17 
 
The rise of counterterrorism since the early 2000s added a new 
dimension to the systematic gathering of information on recipients of 
zakat and sadaqa. “Due diligence” to avoid zakat or sadaqa funds 
reaching “terrorists” led to the widespread vetting of recipients against 
various “terror lists” (Bhungalia 2015, 2315; de Goede 2012; James 
2019; Kocher 2011). The trend of securitizing zakat practice is palpable 
in the Nablus zakat committee’s everyday practices. During my 
fieldwork, I often witnessed how the zakat committee distributed aid 
coming from different international Islamic charities, based in countries 
such as the United Kingdom, Turkey, or Saudi Arabia. People on the 
beneficiary lists of the zakat committee were called up and invited to 
pass by the premises of the zakat committee to pick up food parcels or 
financial aid distributed on behalf of donors abroad. At times, the 
international donor institution was asking the zakat committees to put up 
a poster with their logo during the distribution and to take pictures of 
every beneficiary receiving aid. Apparently, many donor institutions 
insisted on such procedures in order to be able to account for every penny 
they spend to the intelligence apparatuses in the country they were based.  
Transnational Islamic donors were under enormous pressures 
and required extremely detailed documentation on their expenditures in 
order to fend off possible accusations of supporting terrorism. According 
to rumors, these donor organizations were vetting lists of beneficiaries 
with the help of terror databases. The practice of taking pictures of 
recipients and running their names through global data bases—see e.g. 
James’s (2019a, 156–157) discussion of World Check—, however, runs 
counter to the need to protect the dignity of recipients through discretion, 
which is a prominent aspect of zakat in the Islamic tradition (Schaeublin 
2019). 
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The use of security databases is difficult to research. Zakat 
institutions are hesitant to share information on the issue because they 
are in sort of a double bind. If they say that they do use anti-terrorist 
vetting procedures, they may damage their respectability in local 
communities, which see these lists as illegitimate tools of control. On the 
other hand, if they publicly state that they do not resort to vetting 
procedures, they risk being accused of a lack of due diligence and 
compliance with international security policies. 
After 2007, Palestinian zakat institutions started entertaining 
intimate links with security forces. In the Gaza Strip, policemen of the 
Hamas-led government there started serving as committee members 
(Schaeublin, 2012, pp. 69–70). In the West Bank, the zakat committees 
started to work more closely with security forces. These developments 
notwithstanding, the Palestinian Authority continued to recognize the 
locally rooted character of zakat committees—as laid out in the early 
Jordanian zakat law. Since 2010, they have started returning to a more 
decentralized way of governing institutionalized zakat. 
Local practitioners of zakat are very agile in adapting zakat 
projects to a politically challenging context. Since 2012, the zakat 
committee has been running a soup kitchen with staff and volunteers 
cooking food and distributing it to poor households.18 F18 One day in 2014, 
women from neighboring villages and towns came to Nablus to inform 
themselves on how to set up a similar project in their hometowns. One 
of the women who had initiated the soup kitchen in Nablus gave them a 
list of principles to guide their actions: 
 
When you have people’s trust, funding comes to you from local 
sources. 
Do not rely on international sources, as they may cease 
anytime. 
Make sure all your employees donate a tiny portion of their 
salary to the soup kitchen. 
Avoid cooking frozen meat. 
Stay away from those exerting tyrannical power (jabarūt) or 
authoritarianism (taḥakkum). 
                                                          
18  Soup kitchens play an important role in contemporary Cairo (Mittermaier, 2019) and 
Jerusalem under Ottoman rule (Singer, 2012). The 550-year-old Takkiyah Khāṣqī 
Sulṭān soup kitchen is now run by the Jerusalem zakat committee (Iwais & Schaeublin, 
2011, p. 164). Another famous soup kitchen in the West Bank belongs to the mosque 
in Hebron containing the tomb of Abraham, known for his exemplary pious generosity 
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Arrange for an office of the Palestinian Authority to follow-up 
on your activities—if you would like to walk a straight line 
(timshī ṣaḥḥ). 
Do not make the food-aid conditional. Conditions (sharṭ) are 
not acceptable from a sharia point of view. 
 
This list provides a sense of what maneuvering different kinds of 
accountabilities means on a practical level. The recommendations 
emphasize that organized Islamic giving needs to be locally rooted. Only 
with the support of the community can such organizational forms endure 
in the volatile and politically repressive context of the Palestinian 




Zakat institutions are an embodiment of piety that builds on the Islamic 
tradition (Asad, 1986), i.e. a historically continued conversation on how 
to live and act based on the Islamic Scriptures (Quran and Sunna). As 
such, institutional zakat practice is able to adapt to evolving historical 
circumstances. In the recent trajectory of the Nablus zakat committee, 
piety manifests itself in the self-presentation of zakat committee 
members and their administrative practices of keeping a clean account 
of their expenditures. The bureaucratic rationality of zakat committees 
suggests that institutional forms of piety through Islamic giving can also 
be viewed as a manifestation of the “pious modern” (Deeb, 2006), in the 
sense of a relation to piety shaped by modern ideals. Zakat’s malleability 
and agility in adapting to changing political circumstances points to the 
general plasticity of the Islamic tradition (Clarke, 2018). This 
malleability makes zakat an effective source of resilience and basis for 
communal self-help in an adversarial context (Ishtiyya, 2008). The 
embodiment of piety, which subsumes different virtues emerging from 
the tradition, plays a key role in how local communities are able to hold 
zakat committee members accountable through local observation and 
ethical judgement determining people’s reputation. The pressure of this 
observation is considerable, as illustrated in Ahmed Sharaf’s interaction 
with the man calling him on the phone mentioned above.  
Against the backdrop of Hamas’s armed resistance against 
Israeli occupation and its attacks on Israeli civilians that are part of the 
recurring spiraling of violence and counter-violence in the Near East 
conflict more generally, zakat committees came under the increased 
scrutiny of security surveillance. Deep running suspicions about an 
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(Levitt, 2006) drive security surveillance carried out by Israeli and 
Palestinian intelligence services—and, increasingly, also through 
international terror lists and databases. In the course of the US-led War 
against Terror, security surveillance with the aim of deterring 
malpractice through Islamic institutions has a chilling effect (James, 
2019a) on donors and banks working with zakat institutions because it 
creates enormous legal risks (Benthall, 2011a, 2011b, 2017). 
Such international attempts at holding people working with and 
running zakat institutions accountable seem oftentimes highly 
disconnected from local understandings of good governance and 
accountability. This is a problem in various ways. Interventions based on 
such disconnected assessments of zakat institutions risk destroying local 
relief systems that are rooted in and respected by the communities in 
which they work. Moreover, securitized ways of thinking about 
accountability can prevent policy makers and international aid providers 
from understanding local mechanisms of accountability that are effective 
in fragile contexts otherwise marked by corruption and continuous 
contests over power.  
Recognizing such mechanisms requires a sensitivity for ethical 
and moral frameworks emerging from “lived Islam” (Reinhart, 2020), 
with which people working for international organizations are often not 
familiar.19 F19 This raises the question whether different forms of knowledge 
production and conversations should take place on the level of 
international policy making with a view to poverty relief in fragile 
contexts. Locally rooted mechanisms of ethical accountability would be 
a promising topic of “conversation” between anthropologists and Islamic 
scholars (Rasanayagam, 2018) and indeed other researchers. This could 
contribute to the creation of a more decentered and robust humanitarian 
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